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SOURCE Thuk T'ongain.KOREAN UNIFICATION TO BE DISCUSSED IN MOSCOW

A North Korean delegation is planning a trip soon to Moscow to discuss Korean problems with Stalin. Members of the delegation will be: Kim Il-sung, Premier; Pak Hun-yong, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister; Hong Myong-hi, Vice Premier; Chong Chun T'aek, Chairman, National Planning Committee; and Paek Nam-won, Minister of Education. Kim Ch'aek was designated acting premier during Kim Il-sung's absence.

Some idea of the nature of the problems to be discussed may be gathered from the following:

Soviet Ambassador Poses Questions

At the meeting sponsored by Soviet Ambassador Shtikov on 20 February 1949 at the Railway Hotel in Pyongyang, he posed the following questions to members of the North Korean government who attended the meeting:

"As you already know, the new UN Commission on Korea which arrived in South Korea recently requested the USSR for permission to enter North Korea, and the request was rejected.

"What do you think was the Commission's true intention behind its proposal for the unification of Korea? The answer to this question becomes clear if we ask ourselves, 'why is it that the Commission does not dare enter North Korea even with the help of the international police? Why did it not use radio propaganda and interrupt the North Korean election?'

"Inasmuch as the USSR has already told the world that she has completed the withdrawal of her troops from North Korea, we are not in the position to arrest our UN 'guests' and hold them in custody after their arrival here. What do you suggest as to how we should handle this problem? I wish to hear your unreserved opinions about this."

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Sees Possibility of North-South Civil War

An opinion was expressed by Vice-Premier Pak Hun-Yong:

"If by any chance the UN Commission should enter North Korea, we are determined to imprison them at once. Of course, by doing so, we must expect that the South Korean National Army will be sent here to rescue them, and the fight will begin. In this event, we may be defeated temporarily at the beginning... [17 lines illegible]."

"Should we wage a counterattack against the South Korean Army? My opinion is that if our People's Army is defeated by the National Army and the latter should advance as far north as Pyongyang and Hamhung... [3 lines illegible]. In that event, ideological warfare, the most important of the modern war tactics, would play the decisive role..."

Military Situation in North Korea

Choi Yong-kon, Commander of the People's Army, commented:

"Pak's belief that we can win the ultimate victory by ideological warfare is unsound. It is the kind of opinion held by amateurs. It is the basic principle of military strategy that where there is no military power there is no victory. This principle applies well to the Korean civil war. Ideological warfare is only subordinate to the actual warfare. We must realize that the South Korean Army is completely equipped with modern arms including rocket guns, M-1 rifles, and an air force. In contrast, our army is very poorly equipped. This fact has been amply attested by the fact that our crack guerilla troops meet tragic defeat each time they engage the South Korean Army over the Parallel."

"Under existing conditions our army is destined to a total defeat should the South Korean Army launch an all-out offensive against us. We fear the American troops behind the National Army."

"In any war ideological warfare is only of secondary importance. It serves its purpose only when accompanied by a strong military force. While South Korea has 100,000 troops, we have only 50,000 troops including the constabularies. If we are to wage war against South Korea, we must first train our troops and we must also obtain ample military aid from the USSR."

North-South Unification

Hong Myong-hi, Vice Premier, stated his view as follows:

"When we examine carefully today's international situation, our course of action immediately becomes clear by itself. In facing the problem we have no better course than to follow Soviet guidance. The problems on our hands are so enormous that we cannot solve them by ourselves alone."

"The idea of the North-South unification election which the USSR proposed previously at the UN General Assembly seems to be the true answer to the problems. By this, we can avoid the use of military force and can work for the unification by peaceful means. It also solves the question of the UN Commission's entry into North Korea and thereby saves the faces of both the USSR and ourselves. [About 30 lines illegible]. When I visit His Excellency Stalin, I shall reiterate this plan with a stronger emphasis than on any other matter."

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